1. Geopolitical Catalysts and the Rise of the Colombo Security Conclave

The evolution of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) reflects an altered strategic landscape in the Indian Ocean Region. Competition among major powers, along with the growing relevance of maritime and digital domains, has influenced security postures and cooperation patterns. China’s expanding footprint in dual use port development, naval access, maritime surveillance, defence arrangements and Belt and Road Initiative corridors has encouraged India and its maritime partners to pursue more structured security cooperation (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023). As stated, “As China’s influence and presence in the Indian Ocean grows, India has sought to enhance security cooperation with the Indian Ocean Island and littoral nations, through a new ‘minilateral’ group called the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC)” (Solanki, May 31, 2023).

Threats in the region have also become more complex. Maritime terrorism, coastal radicalisation, hybrid tactics, organised trafficking and cyber intrusions targeting ports, subsea cables and administrative networks have broadened the security spectrum. These pressures strengthened the relevance of compact and action-oriented formats capable of quicker coordination. CSC reflects that logic, functioning as a focused grouping grounded in shared vulnerabilities and practical cooperation rather than broad political declarations.

The Indian Ocean remains central to global supply chains and energy movement. Any disruption, whether through a digital attack on port logistics or physical interference with maritime infrastructure, carries consequences beyond regional boundaries. This emerging reality aligns with the view that “strengthening regional partnerships has gained immense significance today due to the rapidly changing and challenging global security environment” (Padmanabhan, 2025, November 20). CSC’s emergence can therefore be understood as a response to geopolitical competition, shared systemic exposure and a shift toward resilience-focused collective security planning.

 2. Institutional Evolution: From Maritime Dialogue to Security Architecture

The Colombo Security Conclave originated in 2011 as a trilateral National Security Adviser level framework between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, with an initial focus on maritime and coastal security cooperation (Solanki, May 31, 2023). Momentum slowed around 2014 as political environments shifted and regional sensitivities influenced engagement patterns (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023). A changing Indo Pacific context after 2020, along with growing exposure to cyber, technological and infrastructure vulnerabilities, revived the need for a structured mechanism. India’s push to re-engage and widen participation signalled a shift away from periodic dialogue toward a more continuous and coordinated security format.

By 2021 the grouping began moving toward establishing a Secretariat in Colombo, with formal founding documents signed by August 2024. Working groups, shared exercises and targeted training followed, covering areas such as cybersecurity, maritime governance, counterterrorism and humanitarian response. These developments indicate movement from consultation to applied cooperation.

The formalisation of a five-pillar mandate in March 2022 marked a clear turning point. Maritime security was retained, but the mandate expanded to include counterterrorism, trafficking and organised crime, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection, and disaster response (Solanki, May 31, 2023). With this shift, CSC began transitioning from a maritime-focused dialogue space into a wider regional security framework with operational scope.

 3. Membership Transformations and Regional Political Significance

Membership evolution has influenced the strategic identity of the Colombo Security Conclave. From its trilateral foundation, the grouping expanded to include Mauritius as a full member, with Bangladesh and Seychelles joining in observer roles. This reflected a widening security community shaped by shared exposure rather than narrow regional boundaries (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023). Recent engagements have also seen participation from additional regional actors, suggesting increasing interest in the platform’s mandate and direction (Solanki, 2025, November 20).

Engagement dynamics continue to be shaped by domestic political developments across member and observer states. The recent absence of the Maldives illustrates how internal and external alignments can influence participation (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023). This context reinforces the need for more institutionalised mechanisms to ensure continuity that is not dependent on political shifts. As noted, “the group will be vulnerable to domestic political changes unless it can better institutionalise itself within the participant’s systems” (Solanki, May 31, 2023).

Despite fluctuations, the Conclave remains a platform for smaller Indian Ocean states to articulate national and collective security concerns while maintaining policy autonomy. It supports cooperation on maritime risks, cyber vulnerabilities, climate linked disruptions and broader systemic threats, while enabling capacity development and shared operational preparedness.

 4. Operational Pillars: The Five-Domain Security Mandate

CSC’s operational framework is built around five core pillars: maritime safety and security, countering terrorism and radicalisation, combating trafficking and transnational organised crime, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Solanki, May 31, 2023). Together, these areas capture the spectrum of both traditional threats at sea and newer risks emerging from digital disruption, hybrid tactics and vulnerabilities that span physical and cyber domains. The structure also reflects an understanding that maritime security is now interconnected with systems resilience, technology governance and coordinated law enforcement.

These pillars guide exercises, training programmes and institutional cooperation. They support flexible collaboration across shared priorities such as coastal monitoring, protection of undersea systems, cyber incident coordination and operational counterterror response. The sixth NSA meeting reviewed a roadmap for 2024 with a continued focus on interoperability, preparedness and institutional strengthening to support regional stability (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 25, 2023). The seventh NSA meeting reaffirmed this direction, noting that “member states were briefed on activities undertaken across the Conclave’s five pillars” and agreed to expand practical cooperation (Economic Times, 2025, November 20).

 5. Critical Infrastructure Protection at Centrality: The Strategic Turn in CSC

Critical infrastructure protection has moved to the centre of CSC’s evolving mandate. Member states increasingly recognise that regional security is no longer confined to maritime boundaries or territorial domains. It must also address the digital and physical systems that support governance, economic activity and essential services. This shift became visible in recent high-level engagements where cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection received dedicated focus and were placed within a clear implementation and review framework (MEA, 19 November 2025).

This focus represents an inflection point. Earlier phases emphasised maritime threats, counterterrorism and crime. The newer orientation reflects the vulnerability of energy networks, subsea communication cables, digital public platforms, logistics corridors and transport infrastructure. Disruptions affecting these systems could trigger cascading effects across borders. The decision to develop a structured action plan for upcoming cycles indicates movement toward operational outcomes such as shared incident reporting, harmonised resilience standards and coordinated response mechanisms (MEA, 19 November 2025).

The growing emphasis on CIP aligns with broader geopolitical dynamics in the Indian Ocean. China’s naval presence, port development and infrastructure investments continue to shape strategic calculations in the region (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023). India’s role in reviving the Conclave after 2020 and expanding participation reflects an effort to build a cooperative governance model grounded in resilience and preparedness (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023). At the same time, the CSC has generally approached CIP in a neutral and functional manner, reflecting member sensitivities and differing geopolitical alignments.

Operational developments reinforce this direction. Reviews led by the Secretariat, cyber and security exercises, legal cooperation pathways and capability-building programmes signal a move from conceptual alignment toward practical implementation (News On Air, November 20, 2025). Ajit Doval described the current landscape as “rapidly changing and challenging,” emphasising shared preparedness, collaboration and interoperability (Padmanabhan, 2025, November 20).

The institutionalisation of CIP is consistent with CSC’s broader journey. Established in 2011 through maritime consultations among India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the grouping paused around 2014 and later re-emerged in 2020 with a permanent Secretariat in Colombo (Solanki, May 31, 2023). Since then, exercises on cyber defence, search and rescue, counterterrorism and coastal and digital security have demonstrated a shift toward scenario-based coordination (Solanki, May 31, 2023).

Participation has widened over time, and recent engagements indicate increasing external interest in CIP as a cooperative domain (Solanki, 2025, November 20). However, political variability remains a factor, with changing national priorities influencing participation patterns (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023). These realities reinforce the need for stable mechanisms, long-term planning and structured cooperation. Calls for a defined mandate and roadmap reflect this requirement (Solanki, May 31, 2023).

Taken together, these developments illustrate a clear strategic and operational shift. Critical infrastructure protection is no longer peripheral. It now forms a foundational element of how CSC conceptualises cooperation, resilience and regional security. As noted in regional reporting, CSC has strengthened cooperation across its five pillars and integrated technology and infrastructure protection into its long-term agenda (Economic Times, 2025, November 20). In an era shaped by digitised systems and contested maritime environments, safeguarding interconnected infrastructure has become essential to trust, stability and sustained security in the Indian Ocean Region.

 6. Applied Cooperation: Exercises, Joint Working Groups, and Capacity Building

The operational phase of CSC has strengthened through coordinated exercises, structured training and practical cooperation formats. Since 2021, exercises have covered maritime search and rescue, cybersecurity drills, cyber incident simulations, coastal enforcement and terrorism-related investigation procedures. These activities signal a shift from policy statements to operational interoperability and shared practice (Solanki, May 31, 2023). Working groups now support sustained cooperation across counterterrorism, cyber policy harmonisation, law enforcement coordination and disaster response, providing a stable framework for sector-specific collaboration (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023).

Capacity development has become central to CSC’s approach. Training in cyber forensics, policing standards, maritime domain awareness and port security protocols addresses capability gaps faced by smaller island and littoral states. The first structured progress review by the Secretary General during the seventh NSA-level engagement reflects a stronger focus on measurable outcomes, including shared standards, reporting cycles and jointly developed operational frameworks (Solanki, 2025, November 20). A proposal to formalise coast guard leadership consultations, raised earlier by Ajit Doval, suggests growing recognition that operational actors, not only diplomatic representatives, must shape interoperability and preparedness (Solanki, May 31, 2023).

 7. Institutionalisation and Continuity Challenges

Progress continues, but CSC still faces sensitivity to political shifts, external influence and differing national priorities. Participation patterns have not been uniform, and recent absences illustrate how domestic realignments can affect continuity (Pant and Shivamurthy, December 26, 2023). Perception dynamics also remain relevant. “Another challenge is India’s dominant role in the grouping, which creates sensitivities among some members who do not want the group to be viewed as anti-China” (Solanki, May 31, 2023). This context requires a balanced approach that prioritises functional cooperation while avoiding geopolitical signalling.

Long term resilience will depend on institutional mechanisms that operate beyond short political cycles. Permanent charters, standard operating procedures, interagency training pathways and semi-autonomous joint working groups are potential requirements for sustained cooperation. Recent statements noting that the Conclave “reviewed regional security cooperation and agreed to deepen collaboration across its five core pillars” point to growing momentum toward more permanent governance models capable of maintaining continuity under varying external and internal conditions (Economic Times, 2025, November 20).

 8. Convergence with Broader Indo-Pacific Frameworks

CSC’s future relevance will depend on how effectively it aligns with broader Indo-Pacific security mechanisms rather than replicating their roles. The framework already intersects with IORA, IONS, BIMSTEC, QUAD-linked initiatives and emerging cooperation formats in digital and maritime governance. As noted, “the CSC countries are all members of the two region-wide Indian Ocean groupings, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)” (Solanki, May 31, 2023). Within this ecosystem, CSC operates as an applied space for implementation, interoperability and joint exercises, complementing more diplomatic or policy-oriented platforms.

Potential alignment pathways include technical coordination on cyber standards with QUAD initiatives, cooperation on digital public infrastructure with BIMSTEC, and coordinated humanitarian and maritime activities with IORA and IONS. External partnerships are also part of the evolving discussion. “Australia’s experience and expertise on the CSC’s five pillars would likely be welcomed by the CSC countries, including India” (Solanki, May 31, 2023). The grouping’s comparative strength remains its operational proximity, its ability to act as a practical mechanism and the trust built through shared littoral realities rather than abstract regional strategies.

 9. Future Imperatives for Regional Critical Infrastructure Protection

With critical infrastructure protection now embedded within CSC’s mandate, the next phase requires a forward-looking framework prioritising resilience, coordination and regulatory coherence. The agenda ahead includes joint mechanisms for cyber incident reporting, maritime infrastructure protection and coordinated cross-border response. Intelligence fusion for cybercrime, hybrid threats and digital espionage targeting governance systems will be essential. Shared standards for cyber forensics, encryption governance and secure maritime digital networks are also needed, alongside protection strategies for subsea cables, port-linked ICT systems, satellite navigation and interconnected energy grids. Institutional pathways for digital sovereignty, secure hardware supply chains and indigenous cybersecurity capacity remain central. Progress is visible through exercises, working group activities and political direction, yet long-term value will depend on sustained implementation and enforceable cooperation capable of scaling across jurisdictions and sectors.

Looking forward, CSC can evolve beyond coordination into a structured governance mechanism for regional resilience. A regional critical infrastructure risk map, regularly updated, would help identify priority sites across ports, communication nodes, energy terminals and transport corridors. Technical interoperability, paired with national CERT integration and shared response models, could support a real-time networked defence posture. This would gradually shift CSC from a platform of aligned interests into a working system of layered joint preparedness.

 10. Policy Prescriptions: Toward a Resilient, Multi-Layered Indian Ocean Security System

Strengthening CSC into a durable regional security mechanism will require phased and deliberate policy direction. Interoperability should be deepened through shared operating doctrines, cyber readiness baselines, resilience metrics and maritime digital safety protocols. Legal harmonisation will play a critical role across cybercrime, technology transfer, digital forensics and counterterror frameworks. Simulation-based preparedness must become routine, testing responses to cyber disruption, supply chain instability, port shutdowns and hybrid maritime activity. Institutional depth is equally important. A formal CSC charter, permanent staffing, shared training academies and protected budget frameworks would help ensure continuity. External engagement may be appropriate through a selective partnership model, involving capable Indo-Pacific actors where useful, without altering CSC’s identity or strategic balance.

As implementation strengthens, CSC has the potential to become the operational spine of wider Indo-Pacific security cooperation. Its comparative advantage lies in agility, proximity and trust networks built around littoral realities rather than abstract regional policy structures. With critical infrastructure protection at its core, CSC can help consolidate comprehensive security across the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. Joint frameworks, common resilience baselines and interoperable response systems would create a more predictable environment for energy flows, trade, digital systems and maritime access. For smaller island and coastal states, such structures provide stability and capability reinforcement. For larger actors, they offer an avenue to translate strategic intent into operational preparedness.

 Conclusion

The Colombo Security Conclave is entering a decisive stage in its evolution. It is no longer a maritime discussion platform but an operational regional security structure in which critical infrastructure protection has become central. Through institutionalisation, functional cooperation and shared recognition of emerging threats, CSC is shaping a resilient security ecosystem. One capable of responding to the vulnerabilities of a connected Indian Ocean in an era defined by cyber physical convergence, geopolitical competition and systemic interdependence.

References

Economic Times. (2025, November 20). India hosts 7th CSC NSA meeting, strengthens regional security ties. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-hosts-7th-csc-nsa-meeting-strengthens-regional-security-ties/articleshow/125464915.cms

Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). (2025, November 19). 7th Meeting of the National Security Advisers of the Colombo Security Conclave (November 20, 2025). Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40310/7th+Meeting+of+the+National+Security+Advisers++of+the+Colombo+Security+Conclave+November+20+2025

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Pant, H. V., & Shivamurthy, A. G. (2023, December 26). The evolving role of the Colombo Security Conclave. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-evolving-role-of-the-colombo-security-conclave/

Siddiqui, H. (2025, November 20). Colombo Security Conclave: NSA Doval Warns Of Challenges, Vulnerabilities. StratNews Global. https://stratnewsglobal.com/world-news/colombo-security-conclave-nsa-doval-warns-of-challenges-vulnerabilities/

Solanki, V. (2023, May 31). The Colombo Security Conclave: What is it and what does it mean for Australia? Australia India Institute. https://aii.unimelb.edu.au/the-colombo-security-conclave-what-is-it-and-what-does-it-mean-for-australia/

[This work has been funded by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), Ministry of Education, New Delhi, under the ―ICSSR Post-Doctoral Programme‖ 2019-20 on “Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme for India”.]